

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L BUCHAREST 0155

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR RO

SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL ROMANIAN VIEWS ON COMMUNIST AFFAIRS

REF: BUCHAREST 0072

1. CONVERSATION JANUARY 9 BETWEEN POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND MIDDLE-LEVEL DEPUTY TO STEFAN ANDREI (PARTY SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS) SHED SOME FURTHER LIGHT ON ROMANIAN VIEW OF CURRENT INTER-COMMUNIST RELATIONS (SEE REFTEL).

2. EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE (ECPC). LIKE ROMANIAN ECPC NEGOTIATOR VOICU (REFTEL), SOURCE SAW VIRTUALLY NO CHANCE ECPC COULD BE HELD BEFORE CPSU CONGRESS; ODDS FOR MAJOR AND SUFFICIENT SOVIET CONCESSIONS TO INDEPENDENT CP'S AT FORTH-CONFIDENTIAL

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COMING EAST BERLIN DRAFTING-GROUP MEETING WERE "ONE IN 100".

ASIDE FROM PCF CONGRESS, NEW POLITICAL CRISIS IN ITALY LIKELY WOULD PREOCCUPY PCI DURING SPRING. THUS, JUNE 1976 WAS NOW MOST LIKELY ECPC TARGET DATE. SOURCE FELT TITO PROBABLY WOULD NOT GO TO ECPC SUMMIT; ATTENDANCE OF SOME "OTHERS" INCLUDING CEAUSESCU WAS BY NO MEANS GUARANTEED; "IMPRESSION WAS" THAT EVEN KADAR WAS NOT ALL THAT EAGER; KADAR WAS "CANNY MAVERICK QUITE DIFFERENT THAN CEAUSESCU AND TITO BUT A MAVERICK ALL THE SAME". NO OBLIGATION FOR FINAL SUMMIT-LEVEL ATTENDANCE HAD BEEN TAKEN. (COMMENT: IT SOUNDS LIKE RCP IS NOW IN FULL-COURT ECPC STALL, WHICH EXTENDS TO CASTING DOUBT ON EVENTUAL TOP-LEVEL PARTICIPATION).

3. KREMLIN INFIGHTING? IN EXTENDED DISCUSSION, SOURCE TOOK PAINS TO DISCOUNT SPECULATION ABOUT THERE BEING TWO (OR MORE) LINES WITHIN KREMLIN -- E.G. ZAGLADIN, ZARODOV -- OVER CORRECT LINE TOWARD WESTERN CP COOPERATION WITH SOCIALISTS AND OTHER NON-COMMUNIST POLITICAL FORCES. WHILE NOT ENTIRELY DENYING EXISTENCE OF DIFFERING NUANCES OR EVEN MILD DIFFERENCES WITH CPSU APPARATUS, SOURCE SAID HE BASICALLY SAW TACTICAL VARIATIONS KEYED TO SPECIFIC EVENTS AND TIMING. FOR INSTANCE "THE HARD" WARNING AGAINST WESTERN CP'S BEING GOBBLED UP BY ALLIED LEFTIST PARTIES HAD BEEN TRIGGERED BY SOVIET APPREHENSION THAT NORWEGIAN CP WAS FACING THIS FATE. REQUIREMENTS OF PORTUGUESE SITUATION COLORED SHADINGS IN OTHER ARTICLES. SOURCE GLOSSED OVER QUESTION OF FAIRLY CONSISTENT IDENTIFICATION OF PARTICULAR SOVIET INSTITUTIONS AND SPOKESMEN WITH RESPECTIVE "HARD" OR "SOFT" APPROACHES. FOR RCP, ESSENCE WAS THAT SOVIETS WERE IN THE WRONG EITHER WAY; KREMLIN HAS NO RIGHT TO DISPENSE ORDERS OR ADVICE TO ANY PARTY, BE IT "HARD" OR "SOFT" KIND.

4. NO HAWKS AND DOVES? EXTENDING THESIS BEYOND ECPC, SOURCE CONTENTED THAT SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS GAINED KNACK OF STICKING TO CONSENSUS. PERHAPS FIVE PERCENT OF ANY LEADER'S SPEECH MIGHT DIFFER FROM MIDDLE-OF-ROAD NORM, BUT POLITBURO COMES TOGETHER ON KEY DECISIONS AND ON CPSU LINE, AS WILL BE SEEN IN FEBRUARY CPSU CONGRESS. SOURCE ADDED HE FELT THAT MOST CPSU APPARATCHIKI HAD ONLY THE MOST VESTIGIAL, ATROPHIED NOTION OF HOW TO DEBATE ISSUES INTERNALLY; TWO OF 100 MIGHT HAVE STOMACH TO REALLY DO SO. SOURCE VOLUNTEERED THIS IS WHY DISSIDENT ANDREI SAKHAROV'S ORIGINAL HOPES FOR MORE CPSU DEMOCRACY AND PARTY CONFIDENTIAL

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DEBATE WERE DOOMED TO DISAPPOINTMENT. SOURCE SAID HE WAS FAMILIAR WITH SAKHAROV'S LATEST BOOK. HE LIKED TO THINK RCP WAS "SOMEWHAT BETWEEN" SOVIET SCLEROSIS AND AMERICA'S "HYPERTROPHIED DEMOCRACY".

5. (COMMENT: SOURCE'S CREDENTIALS ON COMMUNIST-SOCIALIST RELATIONS ARE SOLID. IN 1974 HE EARNED FIRST DOCTORATE TO BE AWARDED BY PARTY HIGHER SCHOOL (STEFAN GHEORGHIU ACADEMY) ON THIS TOPIC

(WHICH TREATED SITUATION OF ITALIAN AND FRENCH CP'S), AND HAS SINCE AUTHORED TWO SPIN-OFF ARTICLES (IN LUMEA AND ANALE DE ISTORIA). THEREFORE, HIS COMMENTS PROBABLY ARE CREDIBLE INDICATION OF RCP THINKING. IN PREVIOUS CONVERSATIONS IN 1975 ALSO HE CONSISTENTLY REFRAINED FROM ENCOURAGING SPECULATION ABOUT CPSU HAWKS AND DOVES. HOWEVER, HE DOES NOT SEEM TO BE DEEP OR DETAILED STUDENT OF KREMLIN AFFAIRS AND HAS MORE A WESTWARD-ORIENTED FOCUS. IT MAY POSSIBLY BE THAT HE FEELS THAT UNDESIRABLE CONCESSIONS TO MOSCOW ARE MORE LIEKLY IF WESTERN OR COMMUNIST NEGOTIATORS BEND TOWARD "ENCOURAGING THE KREMLIN'S DOVES", AND THIS SHAPES HIS COMMENT ACCORDINGLY. THAT SOURCE HAS APPARENTLY READ AT LEAST WHAT SOUNDED LIKE RCP-CIRCULATED LIMDIS SUMMARY-COMMENT ON SAKHAROV'S LATEST BOOK IS INTERESTING).

6. WORLD COMMUNIST CONFERENCE (WCC). SOURCE SAW ABSOLUTELY NO WAY SOVIETS COULD GET WCC TOGETHER BEFORE 1980-1. BAD-ENOUGH TROUBLES IN CONVENING REGIONAL ECPC WOULD BE MUCH COMPOUNDED IN ATTEMPTING TO PREPARE WORLD GATHERING. SUBSTANTIVE IDEOLOGICAL SPLIT BETWEEN ASIAN AND EUROPEAN CP'S IS WIDENING OVER THEORY AND TACTICS, WHILE INVITATION PROBLEM GETS MORE SNARLED EACH YEAR: E.G. BRAZIL NOW HAS 3 CP'S (SEVEN COMMUNIST GROUPS ALL TOLD), ARGENTINA TWO; AUSTRALIA THREE, AND RCP HAS NO IDEA WHO MIGHT BE INVITED FROM LAOS, CAMBODIA (CERTAINLY NOT SIHANOUK) OR INDONESIA; IT IS PROGRESSIVELY HARDER TO DECIDE WHO AND WHERE THE CP'S ARE IN AFRICA. JAPANESE CP IS STOUTLY OPPOSED TO ATTENDING ANY WCC. THUS, ALTHOUGH MAJORITY OF SMALL SOVIET-ORIENTED LATIN AMERICAN AND ARAB CP'S HAVE ENDORSED WCC CALL, NIGHTMARISH DIFFICULTIES FACE ORGANIZERS. SOURCE CLAIMED THAT RCP HAS COME AROUND TO HALFWAY DECIDING THAT NO WCC SHOULD BE HELD UNLESS CHINESE ALSO ATTEND. (COMMENT: RCP TACTIC HERE IS STILL TO CONTINUE TO PROFESS PUBLIC WILLINGNESS TO MEET COLLECTIVELY WITH OTHER CP'S BUT ALSO TO HEAP EVERY POSSIBLE OBJECTION AND DELAY

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IN PATY OF WCC PROMOTERS.)

7. YUGOSLAVIA. SOURCE SAID RCP WAS DELIGHTED YUGOSLAVS SOUNDED OFF SO AGGRESSIVELY ON ECPC ISSUES, BUT THOUGHT PERHAPS THEY WERE HITTING THE COMINFORMIST BUSSINESS A BIT TOO HARD FOR HUGOSLAVIA'S OWN GOOD. ONE HAD TO BE CAREFUL IN GUAGING HOW FAR ONE COULD GO IN PROVOKING MOSCOW; "TOO MUCH NOISE" SOMETIMES WAS COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE. SOURCE CHARACTERIZED YUGOSLAV-ROMANIAN RELATIONS AS "EXCELLENT". FAILURE OF YUGOSALVS TO BACK ROMANIAN NON-ALIGNED OBSERVERSHIP BID AT LIMA HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTING TO THE RCP, BUT THIS WAS ONLY SLIGHT TARNISH TO OVERALL IDENTITY OF INTERESTS, WHICH IS A FUNDAMENTAL CONSTANT DESPITE DIFFERENCES ON CERTAIN ISSUES. SOURCE DID NOT DENY NON-ALIGNED PROBLEM MAY HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED DURING TIME OF ROMANIAN POSTPONEMENT OF CEAUSESCU VISIT TO

BELGRADE, BUT DID NOT THINK THIS HAD BEEN A MAJOR FACTOR IN DECISION. SOURCE ALSO DENIED, MORE ASSUREDLY, THAT SOVIET PRESSURE HAD SOMEHOW ABORTED CEAUSESCU'S TRIP. SOVIETS DID AND DO PRESSURE ROMANIA ON VARIETY OF ISSUES BUT HAVE MORE OR LESS LEFT ROMANIA ALONE AS REGARDS RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA, HE SAID. IF SOVIETS HAD TRIED SUCH PRESSURE, LIKELY RCP REACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO DO EXACTLY WHAT SOVIETS DID NOT DESIRE, AND EFFECT WOULD HAVE BEEN TO DRIVE GOR AND GOY CLOSER. SOURCE WOULD ONLY SAY THAT "OTHER FACTORS" WERE PARAMOUNT IN LAST-MINUTE COLLAPSE OF CEAUSESCU VISIT.

8. COMMENT: SOURCE USUALLY CAN BE COUNTED ON TO GIVE AUTHORITATIVE REFLECTION OF RCP ATTITUDES, ALTHOUGH ACCOUNT MUST BE TAKEN FOR COMPARTMENTALIZATION OF RCP CC SECRETARIAT WHICH LIMITS DEGREE OF KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFIC DETAILS OUTSIDE HIS ASSIGNED BALIWICK (WESTERN PARTIES) AS WELL AS HIS OCCASIONAL TENDENCY TO INSERT PERSONAL TWIST.
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